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Abstract 
We simulate the process of possible interactions between a set of competitive services and a 
set of portals that provide online rating for these services. We argue that to have a profitable 
business, these portals are forced to have subscribed services that are rated by the portals. To 
satisfy the subscribing services, we make the assumption that the portals improve the rating of 
a given service by one unit per transaction that involves payment. 
      In this study we follow the “what-if” methodology, analysing strategies that a service may 
choose from to select the best portal for it to subscribe to, and strategies for a portal to accept 
the subscription such that its reputation loss, in terms of the integrity of its ratings, is 
minimised. We observe that the behaviour of the simulated agents in accordance to our model 
is quite natural from the real-would perspective. One conclusion from the simulations is that 
under reasonable conditions, if most of  the services and rating portals in a given  industry do 
not accept a subscription policy similar to the one indicated above, they will lose, 
respectively, their  ratings and reputations, and, moreover the rating portals will have 
problems in making a profit. Our prediction is that the modern portal-rating based economy 
sector will eventually evolve into a subscription process similar to the one we suggest in this 
study, as an alternative to a business model based purely on advertising. 
Keywords: simulation of competition, subscribing to rating, web portals, evolution of 
reputation 
Introduction 
Portals providing online rating of services, such as financial services, are becoming more 
popular nowadays. A rating portal providing comparisons between competitive services, 
has the potential of becoming a well established web enterprise. For some services the 
comparison is performed based on a set of measurable values such as performance and 
price, for example when the service involves computer hardware.  In such an 
environment, services can make a rational decision whether they wish to advertise on the 
portal, based on the set of measurable values. However, for some services like banking, 
brokerage and other financial services, characterised by such parameters as customer 
support quality, it is impossible to establish an objective set of measurable values. In 
these cases the rating portals publish their scores for the competing businesses based on 
their own private estimation strategy. We believe that evolution of the interactions 
between the agents being rated and rating agents is an important social process which is 
worth thorough simulation and understanding. 
 
There are two common ways to rate services: (1) assigning to each service a score in a 
range of values, or (2) ranking the services in order of preference. In this study we 
simulate the plausible interaction between portals and services using a simplified model, 
and we analyse possible scenarios of how services can influence the portals’ rating 
system. Our model is based on a straightforward revenue model for rating portals, where 
they require the rated services to be paying subscribers in order to obtain a rating.  Within 
this model we follow the dynamics of how the competing services may influence the 
portal to improve their respective ratings. 
 
     This work follows along the lines of the study of an economy of web links, where the 
potential monetary values of web links has been explored and a link exchange process 
has been simulated (Galitsky and Levene 2003). Clearly, assuming that the majority of 
links are established as a result of such exchange is unrealistic, however, it sheds some 
light on how web links might be established in a future economy should the process of 
link exchange become prevalent. Analogously, in the current study, we overstate the role 
of the interaction between a service and a rating portal in order to judge how the former 
may affect the latter in the course of a competition for a better rating. 
 
     Web-based rating portals are normally assumed to be independent, and they do their 
upmost to impress on the customers of the services being rated that this is indeed the 
case. However, the current web economy does not broadly support the revenue model, 
where rating portals charge their customers, so instead, the companies competing for 
ratings fund the portals through advertising their products on the portal’s web site.  This 
model of advertising can be tied in to the rating mechanism leading to a new form of 
advertising.  In some sense this is similar to the paid placement model of advertising on 
search engines, where the (sponsored) ranking for a given query is decided by a bidding 
process for keywords that will be submitted as queries by users to the search engine. 
 
In this study we suggest a plausible model of transferring resources from services to 
rating portals in the form of a rating subscription. In this model services enter into a 
contract where they are pay rating portals for a small  increase of their rating on the 
portal’s list. In the situation where the subscription rate is the same for all participating 
services, the rating results would not significantly deviate from “pure” ones which are not 
sponsored by any services. Therefore, in this case, we can argue that the reputation of the 
rating portals would not be strongly affected by sponsoring services on their rating. The 
drawback of this scheme is that that the services, which decide not to join into a 
subscription agreement, will either be forced to be withdraw from the rating scheme or 
suffer low ratings. 
 
     The methodology of this study is as follows. We analyze the current business model of 
web portals that provide rating services and hypothesise that that would be willing to be 
funded by the services rather than by their customers. We then conduct the what-if study 
suggesting a simple model with rational agents for services and portals as possible for a 
simulation of the subscription model. The resultant behaviour is verified and analysed 
with respect to the possibility of extracting patterns of rating subscription-based 
behaviour from real publicly available data. We conclude the paper with a discussion of 
how the predicted subscription process fits into the current advertising models; also the 
process itself is considered from the standpoint of conflict resolution in multi-agent 
systems. 
Economic model 
Portals are primarily characterised by their reputation. To express this quantitatively, we 
refer to the difference between the average rating of each service and the individual rating 
of each service on each portal. The higher the portal’s reputation, the more potential 
customers it has and a higher the number of web surfers who would follow the portal’s 
recommendation to select a particular (top-rated) service. Also, the higher the portal’s 
reputation is, the higher is its appeal for the services to be rated by this portal, and, 
therefore, the potential revenue stream for the portal is higher. At the same time, when a 
portal accepts resources from the services it rates, its reputation may drop because its 
rating may become less objective. The dynamics of such a process is the subject of the 
current study. 
 
      How should the reputation of a portal be defined? Here we suggest a simple model 
where there is no objective rating:  each portal, while having its own rating system, aims 
to maximise its revenues on the one hand, and on the other hand aims to deviate as little 
as possible from the average portal rating.  The justification for this is that often the 
public perceives the average (or typical) rating (or opinion) as the most trustworthy. This 
is in contract to a distinctive or radical opinion, which may be too risky to follow.  
   
     We select our model for the average rating as being the “best” based on psychological 
studies of how the public perceive the parameters of relating to the subject of interest (see 
e.g. Myung and Pitt 2003). We also conducted the limited study of how financial services 
(mutual funds) are ranked according to search engine keyword-based queries and 
compared this data with the most popular rating of mutual funds according to 
morningstar.com. We observed that averaging is the simplest way to perceive the rating 
data, and that the most popular search engine (google.com) is quite close (however, not 
the closest) to the rating, averaged over the four search engines[ML4] (see the formal 
model section below and the comparison of web search ratings). 
   
     Our model reproduces the real-life conflict between the services and portals: each 
service is determined to improve its ratings irrespectively of how it affects a portal’s 
reputation, and vice versa, each portal wishes to achieve higher reputation and at the 
same time to increases its revenues. No evident compromise is possible. 
  
     Rather than attempt to build an optimal strategy for services and portals, we suggest a 
simple rational strategy, where the agents only take into account two parameters, one 
concerning themselves and the other concerning the opponent agents. One way of 
verifying this approach is by changing the rational strategy into a random one and 
showing that, in this case, we obtain results which do not follow real-world phenomena.  
For example, if the strategy is random on either the services or portals side, then we 
observe the unnatural and irrational properties of the simulated behaviour. In the last part 
of the simulation section below, we will enumerate these properties.  
 
      To provide realistic initial conditions for our simulation, we have chosen thirteen 
mutual funds as financial services and four well-known portals, which provide ratings for 
these services. We have chosen a relatively small number of agents so that we can track 
their behaviour and observe the results. We have also verified the model with a larger set 
of participating agents and although the convergence time is longer, we recorded the 
same phenomenology as revealed by the smaller data set. 
 
       We have simulated all phases of the subscription process, including the initial phase, 
when the services initiate the subscription process to modify their initial rating, and the 
terminal phase, when the services run out of resources or see no further benefit in 
participating in the process. We believe that simulating the full cycle of the subscription 
process rather than just recording the resulting stationary process, provides us with 
sufficient phenomenology to identify similar processes in the real business world. 
A formal model 
We use matrix M to express ratings, where M(s,p) denotes the rating of service s by portal 
p. Ratings of services are represented by integers from 1 to ns,  where the ratings are 
presented in ascending order from the highest rated service (1) to the lowest one (ns). 
Each column of M contains integers 1,…,ns in a certain order such that each integer 
occurs only once, i.e. a portal cannot assign the same rating to two services. 
 
The average rating for a service, s, over the set of portals, is given by:  
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where #p denotes the number of portals.  The reputation for a portal is calculated as the 
reciprocal of the deviation of the rating it gives to each service from the average rating of 
the service, and is given by 
  
( )∑ −=
s
avg srpsM
preput )(),(
1)(  
          
When choosing which portal to subscribe to a service chooses the portal with the highest 
reputation while taking into account its possible increase in rating so that its rating will be 
as close to the highest rating (i.e. 1) as possible.  More specifically, service, s, makes a 
subscription offer to portal, p, such that   
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 is maximized. 
 
Out of the totality of services which make a subscription offer to a given portal, the portal 
selects the one which would decrease its reputation the least. More specifically, portal, p, 
chooses to accept the subscription from the service, s, that minimizes  
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    When portal, p, accepts the subscription offer from service, s, then s transfers m 
resource units to p, and p increases the ranking of s by one. So, if s was ranked at position 
n and s’ was ranked at position n-1, their rankings are swapped. In the special case when  
s was already ranked at position 1, then the portal does not accept the offer from s. 
 
    For example, the top scenario shown in Figure 1 is beneficial for a rating portal 
because after the rating for the subscribed service is increased, this services rating will 
get closer to the average rating over all portals, and therefore its reputation increases as a 
result of the transaction. Conversely, for the scenario shown on the bottom of Figure 1, 
the increase in rating desired by this service will cause the portal’s reputation to decrease, 
since its rating of the service moves further away from the average rating for this service. 
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Figure 1: Two scenarios showing how portals’ ratings change  
 
The algorithmic steps of the simulation are depicted at Figure 2. Two modules where the 
selection strategies are implemented are highlighted by surrounding dotted lines. 
 Calculating the average rating for a 
service 
Calculating the reputation for a 
rating portal 
Service selects a portal with a 
higher reputation to subscribe to, 
taking into account how the rating 
of this service will be increased, 
and makes a subscription offer 
Portal analyses a set of subscription 
offers and accepts the one which 
damages its reputation the least 
Implementation of the flow of 
resources from services to portal 
The rating of the service whose 
subscription is accepted is 
incremented (two services’ rating 
will be swapped) 
 
Figure 2: The modules of the interaction process. 
  
The simulation that produced the results described in the next section was implemented 
in Matlab and is available from the first author on request[ML5]. 
Simulation runs 
We first present the dataset that we used to track the dynamics of the interaction between 
services and portals, capturing the behaviour patterns of the involved agents and judging 
their rationality. The purpose of this dataset is to verify the consistency of our model with 
respect to the rationality of the portal selection strategy of services and the offer 
acceptance strategy of portals. 
 
    We formed the initial dataset of ratings from a selected set of thirteen mutual funds, 
rated by a set of four portals as a 4 by 13 matrix, where each column, representing a 
portal,  contains numbers from 1 to 13 (without repetitions) denoting the ratings of the 
services by the portal. To visualize the dynamics of the interactions, we plot the two 
following types of curves: 
1) Distributions of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals; and 
2) The evolution of these parameters over time. 
 
The first type of curve is useful to show how services and portals are different at a 
specific point in time, and the second type shows the changes of ratings/reputations and 
resources for each agent over a period of time. 
     In addition to the initial ratings, the following simulation parameters were used:  
1) Initial resources set at 1000 units. 
2) Subscription fee (per transaction) set at a flat rate of 50 units. 
 
 
 
Figure3: Distributions of ratings and resources. Both rational strategies of service 
subscription offers and portals acceptance are used. 
 
In  Figure 3, on the charts for  distributions of  reputations/reputations shown in the upper 
half of the figure,  diamonds denote the initial ratings and circles denote the final ones. 
On the charts for resources shown in the lower half of the figure, dots and circles denote 
the respective values for services (left) and for portals (right). 
 
      We observe that about a half of services have run out of resources all of which have 
been transferred over time to the portals (see the dots on the bottom of the resources of 
services chart). Remarkably, these services (except for #13) did not improve their ratings.  
 
      Those services which dramatically improved their ratings still have some resources 
left, which they can use to further improve their rating on portals. We observe on the 
chart that only those services whose average rating is below 11 have actually improved 
their rating. 
       Therefore, one may suppose that only the lowest rated services will have an interest 
in paying a subscription fee to the portals (assuming that an objective and independent 
rating is possible). However, this is far from the truth: the other services need to keep 
trying to move the ratings in the direction which favours them, otherwise, their rating will 
significantly deteriorate relative to their initial rating. What our simulations show is that 
the group of services with an initial higher ratings run out of resources earlier than the 
group with an initial lower rating. This happens, since the first group has to compensate 
for the actions of the second group. 
       Naturally, the sum of the average ratings of the services is constant irrespectively of 
individual ratings. However, this is not the case for portals, whose reputations get worse 
in the course of subscription process. 
 
 
Figure 4: The evolution of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals over 
time. 
 
It takes first 10 steps to establish an equilibrium of ratings between the services and an 
equilibrium of reputations between the portals (see Figure 4). Once the equilibrium is 
achieved, an oscillation pattern appears, which is caused by pairs of financial services 
that have their ratings swapped between position  i and position  i-1. As a result, the 
reputations of the portals are interchanged in a similar way, leading to an oscillating 
pattern between portals as well. The amplitude of oscillations for services is a quarter of 
unit (one out of four changes to the reputations of portals contributes to this amplitude). 
On the other hand, for the portals we observe oscillations with amplitudes which are 
higher than a single unit. 
 
    There is the critical point, at steps 38-45, when the interaction between the agents 
changes, at the time when eight of the services run out of resources. After that, the offers 
of the remaining services are always accepted, and the portal reputations are subject to 
further deterioration, as well as the ratings of these eight services that ran out of 
resources. However, the ratings of those services which have not run out of resources 
during these steps increase during steps 45-60. After that time, there is a smaller number 
of services capable of paying a subscription fee; 3 out of 4 of the portals are not offered a 
subscription and therefore do not increase their resources after this critical point. The 
competition for the subscription offers by services to be accepted by portals is still strong: 
all services wish to subscribe to the same portal, and the portal they all desire to subscribe 
to can only accept the subscription from a single service according to the rules of the 
game. 
 
     We outline the five zones we have detected within the evolution charts of interacting 
services and portals: 
1) The equilibrium establishing zone; 
2) The oscillation zone; 
3) The resources disappearance zone; 
4) The limited resources equilibrium establishing zone; and 
5) The stationary zone. 
 
As is visible in the evolution charts (Figure 3), in accordance to what we have revealed in 
the distribution charts (Figure 4), only the lowest-rated services benefit from the process 
(the bottom part of top-left chart in Figure 3). The evolution charts show that the rating of 
the lowest-rated services increases during both the first (oscillation) and the fourth 
(limited resources equilibrium establishing) zones. There is no service that would 
significantly benefit from the process, since no service has improved its average rating by 
more than 2 units. 
 
 
 Figure 5: The evolution of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals over 
time, where one portal with a low initial reputation is independent (i.e. it does not accept 
service subscription). 
 
When a given portal does not accept subscription fees, its rating in the evolution curve in 
an environment where other portals accepts subscription fees is quite similar to the 
situation above, where every portal accepts subscription fees. The resource curve for this 
portal is a horizontal line on the bottom of the chart; the three remaining resources curves 
go together until step 48 when two of the portals stop gaining any further resources. 
 
The resultant reputation of a portal is even lower when no subscription can be accepted, 
because the objective ratings it publishes will have a stronger deviation  from the 
average, which is mostly affected by the portals that can accept subscriptions. The 
reputation dynamics closely follow the case when this portal can accept a subscription 
(see Figure 4).  Therefore, the overall subscription process is only weakly affected by a 
minority of portals which cannot accept subscription.  
 
 
 Figure. 6: The evolution curves where only the lowest-rated service subscribes 
 
When only the lowest-rated sites choose to offer subscription fees to portals to increase 
their ratings, the process immediately converges to the fifth zone (stationary) without 
passing through the intermediate zones (see Figure 6). In this case portal reputations 
significantly drop, as well as the ratings of all the services which decided to avoid the 
subscription. The case when some service withdrew from the subscription process is 
quite different from that of portals: there is a dramatic change in the process for the 
former, whereas the latter case does not significantly change. The competition between 
the services is not strong enough to lead to an oscillation. 
 
 
 Figure 7: Distributions of services’ ratings and resources, as well as portals’ reputations 
and resources. Portal offer selection is random; the same strategy for services’ acceptance 
by portals as above is used. 
 
When the portals are randomly selected by the services, all portal reputations increase as 
a result of the process, which is unnatural (see Figure 7). With regards to services, we 
observe improved ratings for the initially highest rated services and worse ratings for the 
initially low rated services. Furthermore, the former, having a better rating, gets higher 
resultant resources and the latter, having lower rating, get lower resultant resources at the 
same time. Clearly, sacrificing resources to obtain better rating and vice versa, as well as 
sacrificing resources to preserve the reputation and vice verse, would follow our intuition, 
but this is not what we see at Figure 8. 
 
      It may seem unreasonable to a reader that if services choose the best portals they can 
benefit from, instead of choosing a portal randomly, then the initially best services will 
have their ratings depreciate while the initially worst services will gain in their ratings. 
However, the model plausibility should be achieved primarily on the level of individual 
agents: it is likely that an agent makes selections based on its own utility measure rather 
than performs planning for the whole multiagent community. 
 
 Figure 8: Distributions of ratings and resources. Both the portal offer selection and 
services’ acceptance are random 
 
In introducing the model of the subscription process, we are making assumptions which 
are as general as possible. These assumptions have resulted in observations regarding the 
sequence of characteristic zones in the evolution curves of ratings and resources of the 
involved agents. We therefore conjecture that an arbitrary subscription process that is 
connecting with rating-providing businesses would have a similar set of zones. 
Concerning the last zone, our conjecture is backed up by the assumption that this process 
eventually ends because the services would not want to spend any further resources.  
Since the rating, reputation and resources data for business agents is available, it is 
possible, in principle, to apply the respective feature extraction mechanism to identify the 
simulated process and its current zone. 
Results 
In this study we have simulated the process of the interaction between the services which 
desire a higher rating on portals, whose revenue model is based on a subscription fee 
model where the flow of resources is from services to portals. We called this process the 
`subscription process’. 
 
• When each agent participates in the subscription process, the reputation of 
independent portals, which do not accept subscriptions, drops. Also, the ratings of 
the highly-rated services, which choose not to subscribe to portals in order to 
compensate for subscriptions of other services, drop in the course of the process. 
 
• When just a small portion of lowest-rated services offer subscriptions to portals, it 
nevertheless strongly decreases the reputation of portals accepting these 
subscriptions and the ratings of other services. 
 
Therefore, it seems that when a low proportion of interacting agents participate in the 
subscription process, it has a negative effect on the ratings of others, and thereby 
encourages these other services to compensate for their lost rating by joining the process. 
At the same time, it is quite unprofitable with respect to both ratings and resources to stop 
subscribing to portals. For services, it would be profitable to stop subscribing 
synchronously, knowing that other services would cooperate and also stop subscribing. 
This is, however, impossible because the services do not have knowledge about each 
other in terms of participation in the subscription process. 
 
       In this study we suggested a possibility of how the natural intentions of services to 
sacrifice their resources to gain a batter rating may be formulated and the formulation of 
the intentions of portals to, possibly, sacrifice their reputation to gain resources from 
services, may compliment each other. We observed that the collective intentions of the 
above agents find the matching strategy, not the individual intentions of participating 
agents some of which may deviate from the majority of agents. In particular, initially 
highly rated services do not intend to enlist to the subscription process, but they have to 
accept the rules of the game once the other services have enrolled. 
 
        Since it is possible to observe real-world rating data and its evolution, one can 
extract the patterns of the subscription process, including the stationary zones and the 
transition zones. Such behaviour as oscillations in ratings , for example, will indicate that 
there is a strong competition between services for a particular portal. Such patterns can be 
revealed even analysing the search engine ranking resulting from keyword queries, 
although its mechanism and underlying processes are totally different[ML7]. 
Discussion and Related Work 
We have presented the process of competitive services officially subscribing to a rating 
mechanism on portals. In reality, this process may not have such a formal arrangement 
and occur in way where different participating agents lack information about the 
subscription arrangements of others. We have obtained the sequence of zones in our 
simulation process: transition from the initial zone to the final zone is expected to be 
associated with some legalisation process, when explicit rules of subscription 
offer/acceptance are formed and every agent becomes knowledgeable of these rules. The 
services subscription model should become transparent to the customers, and we suppose 
that some legislation will control the practice of this process and enforce the disclosure of 
its details. Currently, the Federal Trading Committee in USA recommends search engines 
having paid-placement advertising results to clearly separate these from results obtained 
from the search engine ranking algorithm (FTC 2004, 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/). 
 
     We also think that the applicability of the above simulations goes beyond the online 
media. When the practice of subscription to the online rating services becomes generally 
accepted without clear alternatives, TV and paper media may wish to follow it.  
      
     Acceptability of the concept of monetary value associated with rating is not as striking 
as may seem to the reader initially. Consulting various media, the majority of people have 
got used to the idea that all the information is biased and therefore needs some re-
digestion to be trustworthy. We believe that a rating portal, which prefers to stay 
independent, would not impress the audience as being so because the ratings of such a 
portal may significantly deviate from those of other portals involved in the subscription 
process. 
        
       The other possibility that needs to be mentioned is that the subscription process may 
become illegal. In this case the process of subscription laid out in this study may be 
perceived by the reader as a process of corruption. Since our simulations suggest the 
criteria to extract the behavioural patterns from the rating data that is publicly available, 
in this case, we may be able to reveal corruption that is specific to rating portals.  
    
        This study highlights the role of the concept of distributed mental attitudes for 
simulating the processes in a society. The concept of distributed knowledge have been 
thoroughly explored in the artificial intelligence literature and applied to a variety of 
multi-agent models (see Fagin et al 1995, Galitsky 2002). At the same time the notion of 
distributed intentions has not been extensively applied to the simulation of economical or 
social processes. In this study we may define distributed intentions as the intentions of 
the majority of community members that participate in a process such that other members 
are forced to participate as well even if they do not have direct explicit intentions of 
doing so. In other words, the collective intention of a multi-agent community to perform 
an action is the scenario where a majority of its (typical) members explicitly intend to 
perform the action, and the rest of (atypical) members are undecided whether or not to 
commit the action. If they do not perform the action then, believing that other agents will 
commit to it, the atypical agents will find their desired state (a long-term goal) further 
away from that of the typical agent. 
 
      The notion of distributed intention is worth applying to the setting of multi-agent 
conflict (Figure 9). In terms of a multi-agent conflict, the subscription process can be 
considered as a negotiation set out to achieve a state where the intentions of services 
becomes consistent with the intentions of portals. Note that the conflict of intentions 
between the services cannot be resolved. Without a subscription process there is no 
explicit conflict of intentions between the portals, but as only portals are competing for 
subscribing services, the conflict arises.  
 Services Portals 
Permanent 
conflict Conflict 
starts with 
subscription 
process 
Conflict between 
services and portals is 
regulated by the rules 
of subscription process 
 
Figure 9: The outline of conflicts between the parties involved in subscription process. 
 
 
[ML8]
    In this study we used numerical simulation to represent the subscription process, 
however the essence of our approach of obtaining the behavioural phenomenology should 
be referred to as logical instead. The simulation is concerned with the conflict resolution 
strategy, which is formed by participating agents in the online mode. Subscription 
process is a new form of economic behaviour 
 
      Coalition formation is a desirable behavior in a multiagent system, when a group of 
agents can perform a task more efficiently than any single agent can. Computational and 
communications complexity of traditional approaches to coalition formation, e.g., 
through negotiation, make them impractical for large systems. (Decker, Sycara and 
Williamson 1996) propose an alternative, physics-motivated mechanism for coalition 
formation that treats agents as randomly moving, locally interacting entities. 
 
     It is worth considering subscription process by a group of services as their coalition 
formation with rating portals. Coalition formation methods allow agents to join together 
and are thus necessary in cases where tasks can only be performed cooperatively by 
groups (Zacharia et al 1999, Lerman and Shehory 2000, Klusch and Gerber 2002) . This 
is the case in the Request For Proposal (RFP) domain, which is a general case for what 
we call here the subscription proposal. A requester business agent issues an RFP - a 
complex task comprised of sub-tasks - and several request processing agents need to join 
together to address this RFP. (Shehory and Kraus 1998) have developed a protocol that 
enables agents to negotiate and form coalitions, and provide them with simple heuristics 
for choosing coalition partners. The protocol and the heuristics allow the agents to form 
coalitions under the time constraints and incomplete information. The authors claim that 
the overall payoff of agents using suggested heuristics is very close to an experimentally 
measured optimal value, in accordance to their extensive experimental evaluation. 
 
      The results of our simulation study can be considered as creation of a novel 
advertising model that is suitable for online portals. Subscription process is a way of 
increasing demand by bringing the product to the attention of consumers. Advertising can 
be either informative or persuasive advertising. The effectiveness of advertising can be 
measured by the advertising elasticity of demand, which measures the percentage 
increase in demand divided by the percentage increase in advertising spending. In terms 
of advertisement, rating can be considered as a persuasive advertising means. 
 
      Large numbers of models have been used to assist in making advertising decisions. 
Econometric and other market models, as well as decision calculus models such as 
ADBUDG, have been used in the determination of advertising budgets (Little 1970 ). 
Media selection and scheduling models have included linear and nonlinear programming-
type models, such as MEDIAC (Lodish 1966 ), and decision calculus models. Few 
models, such as ADMOD (Aaker 1977), have been designed to deal simultaneously with 
resources and media allocation decisions, where what we model in this study is a partial 
case of the latter. Our model can be considered as a complementary to the advertising 
model of (Vidale and Wolfe 1957). It is an econometric model that represents the rate of 
change of sales as a function of the rate of advertising spending. The tagged effect of 
advertising is incorporated using a sales decay term (The model allows the effect of 
advertising to have different rise versus decay rates). 
 
     Returning to the real-life problems, we cannot reject the possibility that the rating 
portals would form their business model in accordance to what we suggest in this paper. 
The question remains, if not the suggested business model, what else should the rating 
portals do nowadays to have a stable revenue stream? 
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